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OPINION** 
___________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge 
 Rose Umana challenges the amount of restitution ordered in her criminal judgment 
after her conviction for health care fraud offenses.  For the following reasons, we 
conclude that her challenges are unpersuasive, and we will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.   
I. Background 
 Umana was charged with several offenses related to health care fraud in 
connection with her operation of Vision Healthcare Services, Inc. (“Vision”), a medical 
staffing company and homecare services provider that was approved to receive Medicaid 
compensation.  She eventually pleaded guilty to one count of making false statements or 
using false writings under 18 U.S.C. § 1035(a)(2); one count of identity theft in relation 
                                              
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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to the 18 U.S.C. § 1035(a)(2) violation; and one count of engaging in monetary 
transactions using criminally derived property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.1   
 The Government sought restitution for the Pennsylvania Medical Assistance 
Program (“Medicaid”), the victim of the crimes.  The Government derived Medicaid’s 
total loss amount, which forms the basis for the restitution order, from two separate 
investigations, one by the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Bureau of 
Financial Obligations (“the BFO audit”), supporting a $674,996.31 loss, and one by 
Medicare Fraud Control Unit (“the MFCU audit”), supporting a $441,806.12 loss.  As a 
result of these calculations, a total restitution figure of $1,116,802.43 was included in the 
Probation Office’s presentence investigation report (“PSR”).     
 Umana objected to this restitution figure on two grounds.  Through her expert, 
David H. Glusman, Umana argued, first, that the Government misreported the amount 
actually calculated in the BFO audit by $9,361.27, and, second, that it improperly 
included Medicaid payments for legitimate services provided to Vision clients totaling 
$115,837.00 in relation to the BFO audit and $228,399.03 in relation to the MFCU audit.   
 At the hearing on these objections, counsel for the Government explained that the 
Government did not dispute the “change figures” related to the BFO audit.  Appendix 
(“App.”) 56.  That is, the Government agreed that $9,361.27 and $115,837.00 should not 
have been included in the restitution calculation, and stated at one point that it was “not 
                                              
1 Among other things, her plea agreement included the following provision:  “[w]ith 
respect to the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to [Umana’s] conduct, the parties 
agree to recommend that the amount of loss attributable to [Umana] is more than 
$1,000,000 and less than $2,500,000.”  Plea Agreement 10, ¶ 13.   
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disputing those amounts proposed by the Defendant for purposes of the BFO audit,” App. 
61-62.  However, the Government did dispute Umana’s proposed $228,399.03 reduction 
in relation to the MFCU audit, and it substantiated that amount through, among other 
things, the testimony of two witnesses:  Jennifer Snerr, an MFCU supervisory special 
agent, who testified about timesheets for services for the patients and Umana’s 
falsification of employee records and fabrication of documents; and Carol Palinkas, a 
fraud auditor with the Medicaid Fraud Control Section, who testified about the 
documentation requirements and her analysis of the claims submitted monthly for the 
patients in the relevant time period.     
 The Government also argued that the loss amount for which it advocated was 
conservative given that the MFCU audit focused on the claims of six patients over a finite 
period whereas Umana had approximately 150 clients during that time and had been in 
business since 2006.  While Umana’s counsel secured from Snerr on cross-examination 
the admissions that “of that 150, [she] limited [her] review in the criminal sense of those 
6 cases you testified about,” and that she “d[id]n’t have any information here today that 
any of the other 150 cases have any fraudulent billings or any issues with respect to 
fraud,” App. 70, Snerr also affirmed that there were “additional clients identified during 
the BFO audit . . . with additional billing issues.”  App. 87. 
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 After further briefing,2 the District Court overruled Umana’s objections and ruled 
that Umana owed the amount requested by the Government.3  The District Court 
concluded that the Government had met its burden to show the amount of loss, and 
Umana had not shown that she was entitled to any offset.  The District Court further 
noted that “based on the evidence presented during the loss hearings and the 
pervasiveness of the fraud, the loss figure as calculated by the Government understates 
the total actual loss.”  App. 16.  The District Court then stated that, “although some small 
amount of the services provided with regard to the six patients may have been 
reimbursable . . . , [Umana] is not entitled to a credit against the restitution amount due to 
the understatement of the loss.”  App. 16.  Thus, in Umana’s criminal judgment, the 
District Court included an order of $1,184,224.67 in restitution under the Mandatory 
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613A, 3663A (“MVRA”).  This appeal 
followed.      
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We “review a restitution 
                                              
2 Umana proposed that the entire restitution amount be reduced by 52% based on the 
problems that Glusman found in the calculation of the amount related to the MFCU audit.  
The District Court concluded “[s]uch a reduction is mere speculation, not supported by 
any evidence, and would be counter to the court’s finding that the total loss in this case 
has been understated.”  App. 19.  That ruling is not at issue on appeal. 
  
3 The restitution amount included an additional $192.389.51 that the Government 
requested for the first time at the hearing, and that is not contested on appeal.  
 
6 
 
order under a bifurcated standard: plenary review as to whether restitution is permitted by 
law, and abuse of discretion as to the appropriateness of the particular award.”4  United 
States v. Fallon, 470 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
The District Court’s fact-finding is reviewed for clear error, meaning that we consider 
whether it is “completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no rational 
relationship to the supporting data.”  See United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
                                              
4 Given the stipulation and waiver in her plea agreement, Umana’s appeal is necessarily 
limited to the amount of the restitution order and not her offense level under the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Plea Agreement 10, ¶ 13; Transcript of Guilty Plea at 6:16-20, 
8:18-23 (ECF No. 104); Recording of Oral Argument at 8:35-38 (17-
1044USAvUmana.mp3 available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings); see United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007) (“When a 
defendant stipulates to a point in a plea agreement, he is not in a position to make . . . 
arguments [to the contrary].”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).   
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III. Discussion  
 The calculation of restitution is governed by the MVRA, which requires a court to 
order restitution for the “full amount” of the victim’s loss.  18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A); 
see also United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 254 (3d Cir. 2011).  Where the defendant 
disputes the proper amount or type of restitution, the district court resolves that dispute 
“by the preponderance of the evidence.”  18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).  As for who bears the 
burden with regard to that evidence, the MVRA provides that “[t]he burden of 
demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall 
be on the attorney for the Government,” while “[t]he burden of demonstrating such other 
matters as the court deems appropriate shall be upon the party designated by the court as 
justice requires.”  Id.    
 On appeal, Umana challenges the restitution calculation on three grounds.  First, 
she argues that the District Court used the wrong burden-shifting framework in deciding 
the restitution amount.  Second, she contends that it legally erred in finding that the 
amount of loss and restitution understated or underestimated the total loss where the 
actual loss was measurable.  Third, she maintains that the District Court clearly erred in 
finding that its loss figure understated the total loss because the Government stipulated to 
Umana’s loss figure for the BFO audit and offered testimony that it had no evidence of 
fraud beyond that relating to the six consumers in the MFCU audit. 
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 A. Burden-Shifting Framework 
 Umana’s first argument is that the District Court did not use the proper burden-
shifting framework in assessing the amount of loss in calculating the restitution award.  
Specifically, she contends that the District Court improperly placed the ultimate burden 
on her, rather than the Government, to prove actual loss, and that, pursuant to United 
States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir. 1998), and United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 
428, 434-35 (3d Cir. 1994), once she cast doubt on the total restitution figure,5 the 
District Court should have shifted the burden back to the Government to show that the 
offsets she claimed for legitimate services should not be credited against the loss.   
 We see no error in the District Court’s allocation of the burden.  Neither Evans nor 
Raven concerned the calculation of restitution.  Evans considered loss as it related to a 
sentencing enhancement, 155 F.3d at 253, and Raven dealt with determining the weight 
of drugs to be attributed to a defendant for sentencing purposes, 39 F.3d at 432, 434-35.  
This case, however, is governed by United States v. Bryant, where we explained, “with 
respect to an offset for services rendered, . . . that, because ‘[t]he restitution statute 
allocates the various burdens of proof among the parties who are best able to satisfy those 
burdens[,] . . . the defendant should know the value of any [legitimate services] he has 
already provided to the victim[, and so] . . . the burden should fall on him to argue for a 
reduction in his restitution order.’”  655 F.3d at 254 (citations omitted). 
                                              
5 She cites, for instance, the agreed-to $115,837.00 offset for legitimate services related 
to the BFO audit.   
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 Thus, to the extent that the District Court placed the burden of proof on Umana, it 
was consistent with our case law.  It also was consistent with the MVRA, which puts on 
“the party designated by the court as justice requires” the “burden of demonstrating such 
other matters as the court deems appropriate,” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e), which, in our view, 
includes offsets for any legitimate services that were rendered.    
 B. Estimation of Loss 
 Umana next contends that the District Court erred by finding that the amount of 
loss and restitution underestimated the total loss where the true loss was measurable.   
 We have held that a “loss calculation should represent the fraud victim’s actual 
loss,” and that a district court cannot rely on an alternative estimate where the loss is 
measurable.  See United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 826 (3d Cir. 1995).  Here, 
however, the District Court did not rely on something different than the actual loss 
amount.  Indeed, it based the restitution award on the evidence that the Government 
presented in support of the PSR and at the hearing and its determination that Umana did 
not present credible evidence to meet her burden to show that she was entitled to any 
offsets to, or credits against, that loss.   
 We review that determination for clear error and find none.  The District Court 
concluded that the Government met its initial burden of establishing the amount of loss 
and that Umana’s evidence was insufficient to show that legitimate services were 
rendered to offset the amount.  In so concluding, the District Court accepted the 
Government’s witness testimony as reliable and noted that the timesheets and nursing 
notes reviewed by the witnesses showed gross inadequacies and fraud.  In determining 
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that Umana was not entitled to any offset for the value of legitimate services provided to 
her patients, the District Court observed, inter alia, that although Glusman identified 
what he believed were legitimate services, Umana’s documentation was unreliable.  In 
view of the evidence, we cannot say that its determination was “completely devoid of a 
credible evidentiary basis.”  See Vitillo, 490 F.3d at 330 (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
   C. Underestimation of Loss 
   Finally, Umana contends that the District Court clearly erred in finding that the 
loss figure underestimated the total loss because the Government allegedly (1) stipulated 
to Umana’s loss figure for the BFO audit, and (2) conceded, through Snerr’s testimony, 
that it had no evidence of fraud beyond that relating to the six patients whose files were 
reviewed in the MFCU audit.   
 As a threshold matter, it is not clear that the District Court relied on a finding that 
the loss figure underestimated the total loss.  Although it opined that “some small amount 
of the services provided with regard to the six patients may have been reimbursable . . . , 
[Umana] is not entitled to a credit against the restitution amount due to the 
understatement of the loss,” App. 18.  Moreover, the District Court made this statement 
after having already rejected Umana’s claim for a credit because her documentation was 
“almost entirely unreliable,” App. 16.   
 Even if the District Court did rely on such a finding, however, there is no basis for 
reversal or remand on this record, as we see no merit in either of Umana’s arguments.  
First, she asserts that the loss amount could not have been an underestimation given the 
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Government counsel’s statement that the Government was “not disputing those amounts 
proposed by the Defendant for purpose of the BFO audit.”  App. 61-62.  We disagree.  In 
context, and particularly in light of counsel’s more specific statements that the 
Government was not disputing the “change amounts,” App. 56-57, the District Court 
reasonably concluded that the Government’s statement meant only that the Government 
agreed that the initially proposed restitution amount should be reduced by $9,361.27 and 
$115,837.00.  Accordingly, the District Court could consider the degree of fraud found in 
the BFO audit, in addition to that found in the MFCU audit, to substantiate an 
understatement or underestimation of loss.   
 Second, although Snerr testified that she did not have any evidence of fraud in 
cases beyond the six reviewed in the MFCU audit, she did not state that she had evidence 
that there was no fraud.  On the contrary, she testified that there were “additional clients 
identified during the BFO audit . . . with additional billing issues,” App. 87, and 
described egregious problems with record-keeping discovered in both the MFCU audit 
and the BFO audit, supporting the notion that the losses associated with MFCU audit 
were illustrative, not exclusive.   
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
